Past accounting experiments have demonstrated signi®cant eects of absorption vs variable costing systems on pricing decisions, but in individual settings that suppressed market features. The main ®nding of the current study is that a cost-based pricing bias did not persist in laboratory product markets. Given the opportunity to learn from pro®t and market feedback, sellers revised their price oers toward optimum in a manner that compensated for absorption vs variable cost signals. The eects of demand conditions, as revealed through actual trades, dominated the eects of alternative costing systems. #
Introduction
A basic issue in accounting is whether alternative information systems aect economic decisions. When examining this issue, it is important to consider the organizational or institutional setting of the decision-maker, e.g. type of ®rm or market (Hopwood, 1978; Libby, 1990) . In management accounting, there is much interest in how alternative costing systems aect pricing decisions (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998) . Because pricing decisions naturally occur in markets, research on costbased pricing should consider the essential features of the market setting in which such decisions are made. The setting is important for three reasons. First, markets typically give sellers access to information other than accounting signals, e.g. past prices and oers, which may moderate or overwhelm the eects of costing systems. Second, pricing decisions require sellers to set goals as well as process accounting signals, e.g. a 20% pro®t markup on unit cost. Under market pressure, sellers with alternative costing systems may compensate for unit-cost dierences when setting the pro®t goal. Third, markets often give sellers the opportunity to learn from feedback, with the consequence that initially observed eects of costing systems do not persist.
Experimental research strives for internal validity through the manipulation of independent variables, e.g. alternative costing systems, and careful observation of behavioral eects, e.g. pricing decisions, controlling for other factors. But, such concern for internal validity does not immunize experimentalists from the need to consider the organizational or institutional setting of the decision-maker (Swieringa & Weick, 1982) . Regarding cost-based pricing, there has been a long line of accounting experiments providing evidence about the eects of absorption vs variable costing systems on pricing decisions in individual settings (Ashton, 1976 (Ashton, , 1981 Barnes & Webb, 1986; Dyckman, Hoskin & Swieringa, 1982; Hilton, Swieringa & Turner, 1988; Swieringa, Dyckman & Hoskin, 1979; Turner & Hilton, 1989) . The evidence suggests that these alternative costing systems cause pricing biases, e.g. systematically higher price oers under absorption costing. As reviewed below, however, past experiments did not incorporate essential market features such as actual seller competition, price revision in light of feedback, and the threat of bankruptcy. The question remains as to whether cost-based pricing biases persist in market settings.
This study contributes evidence about the eects of absorption vs variable costing on pricing decisions in laboratory product markets. In each of eight markets with a posted-price institution, ten sellers were randomly assigned absorption or variable costing systems, and competed by making oers to sell units at a price equal to the reported unit cost plus a pro®t markup. Although their costing systems diered, all sellers faced the same increasing marginal cost function with an unavoidable ®xed cost and a variable cost that depended on unit sales. Sellers realized a pro®t or loss from their trades, observed other trades, and revised their oers, for each of 48 periods (six sets of eight periods), and ultimately survived or went bankrupt. Predictions of optimal prices and quantities at competitive equilibrium were derived independently of costing systems. Demand was manipulated within and between markets. The within-market manipulation involved a random shift for each set of periods. This permitted repeated observations of seller learning (i.e. price revision) from the starting point of ignorance about demand. The between-market manipulation involved the threat of bankruptcy; demand conditions implied that only ®ve (ten) optimizing sellers could break even on average in the harsh (lenient) markets. This permitted observation of whether seller learning accelerated when the threat of bankruptcy was higher.
Comparable to many laboratory-market studies (Davis & Holt, 1993) , sellers' price oers converged toward optimum in each set of periods. Overall, the median price error (a seller's price oer vs the optimal price) decreased by more than 80% from period 1 to 8 of a set. Typically, sellers who failed to make a sale lowered their price oers, resulting in more units to be sold and market eciency (actual pro®t as a percentage of maximum pro®t) to approach 100%. Absorption vs variable costing systems caused a bias in price oers only in the ®rst period of the ®rst set, when sellers had not yet observed actual trades and were ignorant about demand. The eects of demand conditions, as revealed through trading, quickly overwhelmed this bias, and the costing systems had no long-run eect on pro®tability or survival. Price revisions from one period to the next were strongly associated with both pro®t variances (a seller's actual vs target pro®t) and price variances (a seller's price oer vs the average market price). The threat of bankruptcy accelerated seller learning, in that relative price revision from period 1 to 2 was larger in the harsh vs lenient markets, although this eect reversed in the next few periods.
Regarding cost-based pricing biases, this study's results resembled those of past experiments only in the initial period. Given pro®t and market feedback, the bias did not persist as sellers revised their price oers toward optimum without regard to absorption vs variable cost signals. Further, the bias did not re-emerge in the ®rst period of subsequent sets, when sellers again were ignorant about demand. The eects of alternative costing systems on pricing decisions apparently depend on individual vs market settings. As discussed below, there are crucial dierences between individual and market settings, including trading institutions, incentives, and information for learning. The issue of whether decision behavior observed in individual settings persists in markets has attracted considerable attention from economists and psychologists (Hogarth & Reder, 1986; Lopes, 1994; Smith, 1991) . This study adds to the growing literature on the issue (Camerer, 1987 (Camerer, , 1992 Camerer, Loewenstein & Weber, 1989; Cox & Grether, 1996; Ganguly, Kagel & Moser, 1994; Kachelmeier, 1996) . Speci®cally, the strong association between sellers' price revisions and feedback variances supports the adaptive learning model underlying the behavioral theory of the ®rm (Cyert & March, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988) . Seller learning is an important market mechanism (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) , which helps to reconcile the view of many economists that markets induce optimal decisions at equilibrium and the view of many psychologists that individual decisions are subject to bias. At least in this study's market setting, simple learning processes were eective in moving biased decisions toward optimal decisions. Whether learning is eective in more complex settings, e.g. when sellers compete in multiple product markets, is a question for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses dierences between individual and market settings, reviews past accounting experiments on absorption vs variable costing, and states the hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 describe the experiment's method and results, respectively. The last section provides concluding remarks.
Literature review and hypotheses

Individual and market settings
Psychology and economics both focus on individual decision behavior, but from fundamentally dierent perspectives (Lopes, 1994) . Psychologists view individuals as cognitive information processing systems that translate environmental stimuli, joined with prior knowledge, into behavioral responses. Such processing involves heuristics, or simpli®ed procedures, that economize on a limited capacity for encoding, retrieving, and manipulating information (Simon, 1978 (Simon, , 1986 . Although generally eective, heuristics sometimes produce biased judgments and decisions, relative to probability and utility theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 . Many psychological experiments have demonstrated such biases in individual settings (Arkes & Hammond, 1986; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982) . In contrast, economists build theories of aggregate outcomes, e.g. equilibrium prices and quantities in competitive markets, based on the assumption that individuals make rational choices in terms of utility maximization (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) . The dierence in perspectives has led to considerable debate on the behavioral foundations of microeconomics and on whether biases observed in individual settings persist in markets (Hogarth & Reder, 1986) .
A contentious view of the debate sees a contest between psychology and economics regarding the empirical validity of the rational-choice model. A more productive and integrative view seeks ways in which the limitations of psychology are alleviated by economics, and vice versa (Smith, 1991) . Drawing from experimental economics, Smith stated two broad conclusions from hundreds of laboratory-market studies: economic theory generally provides a correct ®rst approximation of equilibrium outcomes, but is weak in describing the processes of convergence and economizing on decision cost. Economic theory derives predictions using the principle of methodological individualism (Blaug, 1992) ; i.e. ecient equilibrium outcomes are implied by the assumedly rational choices of individuals, along with other conditions. Such derivation is open as to the actual causal processes that produce aggregate outcomes and, speci®cally, does not require a disequilibrium process involving rational choices by actual individuals (Nelson & Winter, 1982) . These considerations suggest limitations in both economics and psychology. Although generally successful in predicting equilibria, economic theory provides limited insight into causal processes. Although validly describing cognitive processes and constraints, psychological experiments are limited by usage of settings that isolate the individual from market forces. From an integrative perspective, a key question is:
Why is it that human subjects in the laboratory frequently violate the canons of rational choice when tested as isolated individuals, but in the social context of exchange institutions serve up decisions that are consistent (as though by magic) with predictive models based on individual rationality (Smith, 1991, p. 894)? To answer this question requires examination of the market processes by which equilibrium outcomes emerge. In this regard, experimental economics emphasizes the role of trading institutions (i.e. the rules governing trades between sellers and buyers), incentives, and information for learning.
Besides testing equilibrium predictions, a major contribution of experimental economics has been extensive empirical evidence regarding the eects of trading institutions on the rate and pattern of market convergence. For example, double auctions in which each subject may oer or accept either bids or asks induce rapid convergence, whereas posted-price institutions in which sellers make take-it-or-leave-it oers induce slower convergence. Perhaps the most striking demonstrations of institutional eects have been market simulations with zero-intelligence traders programmed to generate random bids and asks, subject to only a budget constraint and an endogenous choice set (Gode & Sunder, 1993 ; see also Jamal & Sunder, 1996) . Using double auctions, these simulations achieved almost 100% eciency, despite the absence of arbitrage, bankruptcy, incentives, learning, or even usage of heuristics. Ecient market outcomes emerged as a result of the institution and environment, not from rational choice by individuals (cf. Simon, 1982 Simon, , 1986 Smith, 1991) . Institutional eects are a primary dierence between individual and market settings.
Although not necessary for market eciency, incentives and learning can strongly in¯uence the convergence process. Standard procedures in experimental economics include subject payments under performance-based incentives and repeated trading periods with feedback to allow for learning (Davis & Holt, 1993; Friedman & Sunder, 1994) . Regarding incentives, in contrast with the mixed evidence in psychology (Bonner, Young & Hastie, 1996; Hogarth & Reder, 1986) , the preponderance of evidence in experimental economics indicates that incentives matter in markets, by reducing inconsistencies between actual and rational choice (Smith & Walker, 1993) . The eects of incentives in markets may be enhanced by the presence of multiple, self-interested participants who aect each other's payo through the institution (Frey & Eichenberger, 1994) . At a minimum, incentives reduce noise when greater cognitive eort can improve performance. Regarding learning, the typical pattern of convergence in laboratory markets is for eciency to be relatively low in the ®rst trading period, increase signi®cantly in the next few periods, and increase more gradually in subsequent periods. While this pattern presumably re¯ects subjects' revisions in bids and asks in light of performance feedback, experimental economics contains few systematic attempts to describe individual learning processes and their relation to market convergence.
1 This de®ciency suggests an opportunity for psychology to inform economics about adaptation by cognitive information processing systems. As with incentives, however, generalization from individual to market settings is problematic. A primary dierence is that learning is an interactive, social phenomenon in markets where each subject's performance feedback and observations of market activity depend on the actions of others through the institution.
A growing number of experiments have examined whether biases observed in individual settings persist in market settings (Camerer, 1987; Camerer et al., 1989; Cox & Grether, 1996; Duh & Sunder, 1986; Ganguly et al., 1994; Kachelmeier, 1996) . For example, psychological experiments have shown that subjects in individual settings make probability judgments using a representativeness heuristic which causes biases such as ignoring base rates (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) . Camerer (1987) ran a series of markets in which subjects traded assets that paid a state-dependent dividend. Demand for the assets depended on subjects' posterior probabilities given sample information, and parameters were speci®ed such that usage of representativeness vs Bayesian revision implied dierent equilibrium prices. Camerer (1987) found that prices tended toward Bayesian predictions, with only a small degree of bias attributable to representativeness. Duh and Sunder (1986) had similar results. In contrast, Ganguly et al. (1994) reported that prices in their asset markets were persistently closer to representativeness-based predictions than Bayesian predictions, especially in markets where representativeness implied higher prices. Relatively few subjects made unbiased, pretrading probability judgments, even after 16 periods, and these subjects were not suciently active to drive prices to Bayesian predictions.
Preference reversal is another frequent ®nding in individual settings (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983) . Suppose subjects are asked to perform two tasks: (1) choose lottery A with a high probability of a moderate payo or lottery B with a lower probability of a higher payo, and (2) value A and B on a monetary scale. Many subjects choose A but place a higher value on B. Cox and Grether (1996) examined preference reversals by manipulating the response mode (choice vs valuation), monetary incentives (strong vs moderate vs none), and setting (individual vs market). There were ®ve task repetitions to allow for learning. The results showed high rates of preference reversal in the ®rst repetition, but much lower rates by the ®fth repetition, especially in market settings. As subjects in markets repeated the task, they incorporated past prices into their oers.
A ®nal example concerns the sunk-cost fallacy whereby an individual's decision is aected by a normatively irrelevant historical cost (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) . Kachelmeier (1996) ran a series of markets to examine one aspect of sunk cost. Subjects were either sellers or buyers of a security. Prior to trading, each seller was assigned one unit of the security, an unavoidable sunk cost, and a redemption value (opportunity cost) in case of no sale. A between-market manipulation was cost of sale (sunk cost vs opportunity cost) in a pro®t feedback report, although the formula for subject payments did not depend on this variable. The results showed that bids and asks were persistently higher in the markets with the sunk-cost format. Sellers' aversion to a paper loss produced an upward bias in asks, and buyers reacted by raising bids. However, the bias did not aect market prices or eciency, because of shifts in the percentages of seller-vs buyer-initiated trades.
In sum, experimental economics provides evidence from hundreds of market studies (not focused on individual biases) that generally con®rms the equilibrium predictions, and indirectly the rationality assumption, of economic theory.
The much smaller group of studies focused on individual biases in markets provides more equivocal evidence. Some studies found that individual biases were reduced, if not eliminated, in market settings. Other studies found that individual biases had persistent eects on market oers and prices. Before drawing conclusions, more research is needed on the mechanisms that drive markets and the conditions under which these mechanisms induce or fail to induce rational decisions.
Cost-based pricing
Surveys indicate that ®rms predominantly use pricing policies that set initial prices equal to unit cost plus target pro®t (see Dorward, 1987 , for a review). For example, Govindarajan and Anthony (1983) surveyed over 500 industrial ®rms of the Fortune 1000, asking respondents to specify``the method that comes closest to the one you usually use in arriving at the normal selling price for your typical product.'' Variations of absorption (variable) cost-based pricing were speci®ed by 83% (17%) of the respondents. Shim and Sudit (1995) similarly surveyed 141 ®rms; 70% (12%) used absorption (variable) cost-based pricing, and 18% used``market-based or competitive'' pricing. Economists have long criticized cost-based pricing, for several reasons (Oxenfeldt & Baxter, 1961) . This procedure uses historical or budgeted cost, rather than opportunity cost, and average variable cost, rather than marginal cost. Absorption costing includes average ®xed cost which is normatively irrelevant to short-run pricing. The pro®t markup on cost does not explicitly incorporate information about demand.
Countering such criticism, justi®cations of costbased pricing invoke a decision-cost argument. Given limited knowledge about demand and opportunity cost, ®rms employ simpli®ed procedures that economize on decision cost (Cyert & March, 1992) . When initial oers are subject to revision depending on the reactions of customers and competitors, cost-based pricing may be procedurally rational, i.e. economizing on decision cost, though not substantively rational, i.e. optimal without regard to decision cost (Simon, 1976) . Accordingly, costing systems may play a role in explaining the disequilibrium process of price formation involving procedurally rational sellers, but no role in predicting equilibrium prices assuming substantively rational choice (Waller, 1995) . In this regard, an important issue is whether alternative costing systems bias price oers in the market convergence process. Using models and methods from psychology, past accounting experiments have demonstrated cost-based pricing biases in individual settings, but none has examined whether such biases persist in markets.
Early experiments used the lens model from psychology to examine the sensitivity of sellers' pricing decisions to changes in costing systems (Ashton, 1976 (Ashton, , 1981 Dyckman et al., 1982; Swieringa et al., 1979) . Ashton (1976) had each seller set prices for 60 products using three cues, i.e. unit cost, demand elasticity, and competitor responsiveness. Absorption vs variable costing was manipulated on a within-subject basis after 30 prices had been set, with the order of systems varied over subjects. Sellers starting with variable (absorption) costing also were told that the change in systems resulted in less (more) useful information due to the inclusion (exclusion) of ®xed cost. Two control groups used either absorption or variable costing for all 60 products. Ashton constructed a regression model of each seller's pricing policy over the ®rst 30 products, and computed the mean absolute dierence between actual and predicted prices for the last 30 products. This difference measured sensitivity to the change in costing systems, which was signi®cantly higher for the experimental vs control groups. In a critique, Libby (1976) expressed concerns about the confounded manipulation of costing-system change and stated usefulness, and about dierences in cost data for the experimental and control groups. Responding to these concerns, Swieringa et al. (1979) performed a replication, isolating the manipulation of costing-system change and holding constant the cost data over groups. Swieringa et al. (1979) found that sellers with a costing-system change adjusted their information processing more than the control groups did. In another replication using older subjects with more exposure to accounting, Dyckman et al. (1982) reported similar results.
Two experiments tested hypotheses from Lere (1986) about the eects of absorption vs variable costing on the correspondence between pro®t-maximizing decisions and cost-based oers made with a speci®c heuristic (see also Dickhaut & Lere, 1983) . The heuristic consisted of the following steps: (1) the seller suggests a price, p, to his accountant, (2) the accountant determines expected demand, Eqp], and reports the unit cost, c, (3) the seller evaluates c against c Ã E pq H p qpaEq H p, and (4) the process iterates until c c Ã . The degree to which the heuristic approximates pro®t maximization depends on absorption vs variable costing.
2 In one experiment (Hilton et al., 1988) , each subject chose between absorption and variable costing, and made a price oer after iterating with a simulated accountant for up to ten repetitions. Each seller knew the demand function (or probability distribution of demand functions) and type of cost function (linear vs nonlinear and stochastic vs deterministic). Sellers had monetary incentives and pro®t feedback after each trial. The results did not support Lere's hypotheses. Sellers' price oers diered signi®cantly from prices under the assumed heuristic as well as from optimal prices, and most sellers chose absorption over variable costing under all conditions. Also, mean price oers were higher under absorption vs. variable costing under all conditions. In an experiment involving quantity decisions, Turner and Hilton (1989) similarly found signi®cant divergences from optimum and a general preference for absorption costing.
The above experiments provided limited evidence regarding the role of absorption vs variable costing for pricing decisions in markets. The stream of lens-model studies beginning with Ashton (1976) examined pricing decisions in individual settings that lacked most of the distinctive features 2 Lere's (1986) model made the following predictions. Given a linear, deterministic cost function, variable costing induces better prices, i.e. prices set by the heuristic are closer to optimal prices, than absorption costing does. Given a linear, stochastic cost function and deterministic demand, variable (absorption) costing induces better prices under risk neutrality (aversion). Given a nonlinear cost function, absorption costing always induces better prices. of markets discussed earlier. Despite many task repetitions, sellers had neither monetary incentives nor pro®t feedback. Although available information included cues about market conditions, there was no actual trade between sellers and buyers. The later studies (Hilton et al., 1988; Turner & Hilton, 1989 ) added improvements such as formal models that recognized decision cost, monetary incentives, task repetitions (under changing conditions), and pro®t feedback. However, these studies assumed decision heuristics involving interaction between the seller and accountant, rather than interaction among sellers and buyers in markets. The studies also assumed that demand was known, at least as a probability distribution. All of the above studies involved one-shot oers with no chance of price revision or convergence, and none included actual seller competition or the threat of bankruptcy.
Although not concerned with absorption vs variable costing, Gupta and King (1996) examined cost-based decisions in a setting that built upon Hilton et al. (1988) . Gupta and King (1996) manipulated cost-report accuracy and production complexity in a multiproduct ®rm. Each subject acted as a monopolist (i.e. no seller competition) who made cost forecasts for three products given imperfect cost reports. There was no explicit pricing decision. Instead, each subject's cost forecast together with a simulated demand function determined price, quantity, and pro®t. Also, there was no ®xed or joint cost. Total variable cost depended on each product's requirements for material and resources in three conversion processes. The more accurate cost report was based on two conversion cost pools, while the less accurate report was based on only one. Each product in the more complex ®rm used resources nonproportionately in the conversion processes, while each product in the simpler ®rm used resources proportionately. Subjects went through 20 task repetitions under stable conditions, e.g. constant demand, with monetary incentives and feedback. As expected, the results showed higher pro®t given more accurate cost reports and a simpler ®rm. The results also revealed systematic learning whereby subjects revised their forecasts toward optimum, despite inaccurate cost reports. Learning from experience may be a procedurally rational substitute for costreport accuracy. As elaborated below, this study's experiment also involved the procedural rationality of seller learning given pro®t and market feedback.
Hypotheses
The experiment incorporated many features that, taken together, distinguish individual and market settings, e.g. monetary incentives, task repetitions, pro®t feedback, trading institution, seller competition, endogenous information about demand, and the threat of bankruptcy. The experiment produced evidence about four hypotheses.
The ®rst hypothesis concerns market convergence. It was expected that sellers' price oers would converge toward optimum over each set of trading periods. Con®rming this expectation was necessary to establish a general correspondence between this study's market setting and other laboratory markets. Competitive equilibrium predictions were based on market demand and supply, without regard to costing systems. There were four lenient markets in which demand tended to be relatively high (Fig. 1) , and four harsh markets in which demand tended to be relatively low (Fig. 2) . The reason for the between-market manipulation of demand was to vary the threat of bankruptcy faced by sellers. A seller went bankrupt when his cash balance (initial endowmentpro®t or loss) was negative, and suboptimal decisions were more likely to cause bankruptcy in the harsh markets. Each market used six demand functions corresponding to six sets of eight periods. The reason for the within-market manipulation of demand was to create recurrent disequilibrium states in which sellers were ignorant about demand. This allowed repeated observations of the convergence process. The supply function (see Figs. 1 and 2) was constructed by aggregating the sellers' marginal cost functions. For each set of a market, the optimal price and quantity (Table 1) were determined by the intersection of the supply function and relevant demand function. Seller performance was measured by price error, i.e. the absolute difference between a seller's price oer and the optimal price, where the latter depended on the set and market (Table 1) .
3 Consistent with convergence toward optimum, the ®rst hypothesis is:
H1. Sellers' price errors approach zero over periods 1±8 of a set.
The second and main hypothesis concerns the persistence of a cost-based pricing bias in the market convergence process. Because of the market features discussed earlier, it was expected that a bias in price oers due to absorption vs variable costing would not persist. Assuming higher price oers under absorption costing in the initial period (comparable to the ®ndings in individual settings), it was expected that sellers would respond to pro®t and market feedback by revising their price oers toward optimum without regard to unit-cost signals.
Accordingly, the results should reveal an interactive eect for costing systems and periods, whereby price oers dier under absorption vs. variable costing in the early, but not later, periods of a set. 4 H2. A bias in price oers due to absorption vs variable costing does not persist over periods 1±8 of a set.
The third hypothesis concerns seller learning. Consistent with the behavioral theory of the ®rm (Cyert & March, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988) , seller learning may be viewed as the adaptation of current decisions to experiential feedback on past decisions. Sellers received two kinds of feedback, pro®t or loss from their own trades and observations of other trades. Pro®t feedback was measured by pro®t variance, i.e. the dierence between a seller's actual and target pro®t last period. Target pro®t equaled a seller's markup times oered 3 Absolute rather than signed dierences were used, because analyses that aggregate over positive and negative dierences would understate the average magnitude of deviations from optimum (cf. Bloom®eld, 1997) . Also, price oers converged toward optimum from above (positive dierences) in some sets, but from below (negative dierences) in other sets. Analyses that aggregate over sets would involve the same understatement problem. 4 Although sellers returned to a similar state of ignorance about demand in period 1 of each set, it is an open issue whether the same pattern of a cost-based pricing bias (i.e. its emergence and persistence or elimination) unfolds in each set. Task experience may aect the pattern in later sets (see Results). quantity under absorption costing, or, markup times oered quantity minus ®xed cost under variable costing. When a seller made a sale at the oered price and quantity, the pro®t variance was zero; otherwise, the pro®t variance was unfavorable. Market feedback was measured by price variance, i.e. the dierence between a seller's price oer and the average price per unit sold last period. It was expected that pro®t and price variances would be correlated, but not perfectly. High price oers relative to competitors' were likely to result in both pro®t and price variances, whereas low price oers relative to competitors' were likely to result in a price variance but no pro®t variance. Seller learning was measured by price revision, i.e. the increase or decrease in a seller's price oer from t to t 1t 1Y XXXY 7. It was expected that larger pro®t and price variances would induce larger price revisions.
H3. Price revisions depend on feedback regarding pro®t and price variances.
The last hypothesis concerns the threat of bankruptcy. Using lenient vs harsh markets as a proxy for the threat of bankruptcy, it was expected that sellers' price revisions would accelerate as the threat of bankruptcy increased. When comparing price revisions between the lenient vs harsh markets, however, a possible confound was that dierences in optimal prices may have led to dierences in total price revisions, regardless of the rate of price revisions. Accordingly, a second measure of learning, which used each seller as his own control, was relative price revision, i.e. the ratio of a seller's price revision from period t to t 1t 1Y XXXY 7 over his total price revision from period 1 to 8 of a set. If a greater threat of bankruptcy causes faster price revision, then the results should reveal an interactive eect for markets and periods, whereby relative price revision is higher in the harsh vs. lenient markets in the early periods of a set. 5 H4. A greater threat of bankruptcy increases relative price revision in the early periods of a set. 5 By construction, each subject's relative price revision sums to one over a set of periods. If relative price revision is higher in the harsh markets for early periods (H4), then the measure must be higher in the lenient markets for later periods.
Method
The procedure for the lenient markets is described ®rst, followed by dierences for the harsh markets. In each trading period, ten sellers (undergraduate business students) made oers to sell a product. As a buer against possible loss, each seller received an initial endowment of 50,000 francs, the experimental currency. Making an oer consisted of stating the maximum quantity for sale between one and ®ve units, referring to a schedule showing the unit cost at each quantity, and adjusting the unit cost for target pro®t. The schedule was prepared under absorption costing for ®ve sellers and under variable costing for ®ve sellers, holding constant the true cost function. 6 The unit cost under absorption costing was 1890, 1025, 737, 715 and 702 francs, for one to ®ve units, respectively; the corresponding numbers under variable costing were 30, 95, 117, 250 and 330 francs. There were 48 periods, split into six sets of eight. Buyers were simulated with a computer program executing the demand functions in Figs. 1 and 2.
7 Demand was constant for each set, but varied over sets. Speci®cally, D1 in Fig. 1 was employed for set 1, D2 for set 2, and so on. Periodic pro®t or loss equalled the oered price times units sold minus total variable and ®xed cost. Variable cost depended on units sold, but ®xed cost was unavoidable. A bankruptcy occurred when a seller's franc balance was negative. At the end of the experiment, each seller's franc balance was translated into the probability of winning $20 in a lottery, at a rate of 1/100,000. This payo structure provided a control for risk preference, in that a seller who maximized the expected probability of winning the cash prize was risk-neutral as to francs when making sales oers (Davis & Holt, 1993) . Cost and demand parameters were speci®ed such that optimal prices and quantities implied zero pro®t on average (Table 1) . The expected probability of winning the prize was 0.50 (50,000/100,000), and expected pay was $25 (0.50Â$20+$15 for participating).
To ensure consistency over markets, the instructions were presented to sellers by playing a pre-recorded tape. The speaker on the tape read the instructions aloud, while sellers read along in a booklet. The appendix contains the instructions and oer sheet for sellers with absorption costing. The instructions and oer sheet for sellers with variable costing were identical, except for the cost schedule. The instructions described the market setting in detail: the trading institution, task of making oers, sequence of events in a period, initial endowment and payo structure, general nature of demand and timing of random shifts, limits on unit sales, pro®t computation, periodic ®xed cost and variable cost, cost schedule, price limits (0±2000 francs), and bankruptcy rule. 6 The true cost function was a ®xed cost of 1860 francs, and a marginal cost of 30 francs for the ®rst unit sold, 160 francs for the second and third units sold, and 650 francs for the fourth and ®fth units sold. Relatively large steps in the cost function were used to ensure nontrivial dierences in optimal prices among alternative demand levels in each market (Figs. 1 and 2 and Table 1) . 7 To illustrate, D1 in Fig. 1 implied that buyers were willing to acquire one unit at a price of 1245 francs, two units at 1235 francs, three units at 1225 francs, four units at 1215 francs, F F F, and 50 units at 755 francs. Suppose that two sellers each oered to sell two units, but at dierent prices, i.e. 1210 francs (seller A) and 1220 francs (seller B). The trades would be two units at 1210 francs for seller A and one unit at 1220 francs for seller B.
After reading the instructions, sellers were shown four examples covering various possible sales oers and demand conditions. For simplicity, each example included only two sellers, but gave detailed explanations for completing oer sheets and interpreting feedback. Example 1 was a case in which the sellers oered dierent prices and quantities, and buyers accepted both oers. Example 2 repeated the oers of Example 1, but demand was lower such that only one seller made a sale. Example 3 was a case in which the sellers oered the same price, but demand was not sucient for each to sell the oered quantities. When sellers oered the same price, the number of units sold were divided as evenly as possible. When an even distribution was not possible, the remaining unit(s) was allocated randomly. Example 4 was a case in which a seller went bankrupt. The examples were prepared under absorption costing for ®ve subjects and variable costing for ®ve subjects. The speaker on the tape did not refer to speci®c values of cost or markups. All subjects heard the same description of the market procedure.
In each period, sellers had 3 min to complete the oer sheet, after which the sheets were collected and the oers were entered into a computer. Periodic feedback consisted of two parts. One part was market activity (i.e. price and quantity for each sale) which was displayed publicly on large screens. Another screen displayed publicly the number of surviving sellers, which was updated when a bankruptcy occurred. The other part was each seller's results (i.e. the price and quantity for a sale, revenue, total cost, pro®t or loss, and beginning and ending franc balances) which were displayed privately on a terminal. These displays continued until the oers for the next period were entered. To ensure that sellers paid attention to both types of feedback, there was a 20-s lag between initiation of the public display of market results and private display of each seller's results.
This procedure was repeated for 48 periods. The entire experiment, including the instructions, lasted approximately 2.5 h. At the end, the lottery was played separately for each seller with a positive franc balance, who was paid according to the above description.
The harsh markets followed the same procedure, with one exception.
8 Because of the dierence in pro®t opportunities, the cash prize was raised to $100 in order to equate expected pay for all markets. Given optimal behavior in the harsh markets (Table 1) , each seller's ending franc balance would be 9840 francs (50,000À48Â836.66). The expected probability of winning the prize was.10 (9,840/100,000), and expected pay was $25 (0.10Â$100+$15). This procedure held expected pay constant at $25 for the lenient and harsh markets.
Results
Convergence toward optimum
H1 predicted that sellers' price errors approach zero over periods 1±8 of a set. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics regarding seller and market performance by set and period, separately for the lenient and harsh markets. 9 The ®rst column shows medians for price error over sellers; e.g., in period 1 of set 1, the median price error was 245 (628) francs, relative to the optimal price of 755 (395) francs, for the 40 sellers in the lenient (harsh) markets. Changes in median price errors from period 1±8 show a clear pattern of convergence toward optimum. Averaging over sets for the 8 In two of the harsh markets, the number of periods was allowed to exceed 48 (to at most 51), in order to achieve a minimum bankruptcy rate of 4/10. The intent was to observe whether bankruptcies were related to costing systems. There were 22 survivers in the harsh markets after all periods; 13 were assigned absorption costing and 9 were assigned variable costing (1 2 1X62Y p b 0X10). To facilitate comparisons between markets, the Results section analyzes the data for periods 1±48 only.
9 All laboratory-market studies with multiple trading periods share the problem of serial dependence among observations over time. Indeed, H1 predicts a particular pattern of serial dependence. The approach taken here is to present the results on a disaggregated basis and, as appropriate, present additional aggregate tests. The disaggregated analyses were not intended as independent hypothesis tests. Repeated-measures analysis of variance was used in the aggregate tests, with set and period as within-subject factors. These tests accommodated serial dependence by assessing the eects of each within-subject factor, and between-subjects factors, with respect to distinct error terms (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & Wasserman, 1996) . a The ®rst (second) entry in each cell pertains to the lenient (harsh) markets. Entries in the ®rst through third columns are medians over sellers for price error, quantity error, and pro®t error, respectively. Entries in the fourth column are frequencies of sellers with trades. Entries in the ®fth column are medians over markets for eciency. lenient (harsh) markets, the median price error decreased by 85% (81%) from periods 1 to 8. For each set, a Wilcoxon sign test was used to compare the price errors in period 1 and 8, separately for the lenient and harsh markets; in each case, the decrease was highly signi®cant (p`0X001). As an aggregate test, a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed using LN (price error) as the dependent measure, with sets (1±5) and periods (1±8) as within-subjects factors, and lenient vs harsh markets and absorption vs variable costing as between-subjects factors. Excluding set 6 avoided the problem of missing values due to bankruptcies.
10 Using logged price oers as the dependent variable reduced the inordinate eects of unusually high or low oers. The ®rst column of Table 3 shows the main and interactive eects (results in other columns are discussed later). The relevant result for H1 was the signi®cant eect of periods (F 254X96Y p`0X001). Consistent with the convergence pattern in the ®rst column of Table 2 , the mean of LN (price error) decreased monotonically from period 1 to 8. These results support H1. Table 3 shows other signi®cant eects for LN (price error), including sets (F 86X43Y p`0X001), markets (F 9X60Y p`0X003), periodsÂmarkets (F 7X39Y p`0X001), setsÂmarkets (F 29X10Y p`0X001), periodsÂsets (F 13X16Y p`0X001), and periods ÂmarketsÂsets (F 11X52Y p`0X001). The mean of LN (price error) decreased from set 1 to 5, which may be attributed to task experience and changing demand conditions. The mean generally was higher for harsh vs lenient markets, and the dierence was larger in later periods. The market eect also varied over sets. The mean was higher for harsh (lenient) markets in sets 2 and 4 (3 and 5), and about the same in set 1. In all sets and markets, the mean decreased over periods, but at somewhat dierent rates.
11
In addition to price errors, Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on other measures of seller and market performance. The second and third columns show the median quantity errors and pro®t errors, respectively. A quantity error was de®ned as the absolute dierence between a seller's quantity oer and the optimal quantity, and a pro®t error as the absolute dierence between a seller's actual and optimal pro®t, where the optimal values depended on the set and market (Table 1 ). The fourth column shows the number of trades divided by the number of participating sellers. The last column shows the median eciency over markets. Eciency increased toward 100% as the total quantity sold increased toward optimum, but at a decreasing rate because buyers' marginal value was decreasing and sellers' marginal cost was increasing.
12 Generally, these measures were consistent with the decrease in price errors over periods. In most sets and markets, median quantity errors quickly decreased to zero, median pro®t errors decreased over periods, and both the percentage of sellers with trades and market eciency approached 100%. 13 These convergence results are comparable to many laboratory-market studies. 10 As expected, some sellers in the harsh markets went bankrupt, beginning in period 3 of set 6; nine sellers went bankrupt by period 8 of set 6.
11 As to the interactive eect of periods Â markets Â sets, the mean of LN (price error) was higher for the harsh (lenient) markets in later periods of sets 2 and 4 (1); the mean was higher for the harsh (lenient) markets in most periods of set 3 (5). 12 To illustrate, the demand function for set 1 of the lenient markets implied that buyers valued the ®rst unit at 1245 francs, second unit at 1235 francs, third unit at 1225 francs, F F F, and 50th unit at 755 francs. Given the optimal quantity of 50 units, the aggregate value to buyers was 50,000 francs, and the aggregate variable cost to sellers was 16,500 francs (10Â30+20Â160+ 20Â650), so that maximum pro®t was 33,500 francs. Suppose that three units were sold by dierent sellers (at any prices between 30 and 1225 francs), resulting in aggregate pro®t of 3615 francs (1245+1235+1225À30Â3). In this case, eciency would be 11% (3,615/33,500).
13 There were some exceptions to the general convergence pattern. Regarding pro®t errors, there was minimal convergence in sets 2, 5, and 6 of the harsh markets, which may be attributed to the relatively small change in pro®t when a sale was made vs no sale. In set 6 of the harsh markets, for example, no sale implied a pro®t of -1,860 francs, compared to optimal pro®t of À1825 francs assuming the sale of one unit at 65 francs. Regarding the percentage of sellers with trades, the pattern was dierent for sets 3 and 4, compared to the other sets, in that the percentage started and stayed high. Figs. 1 and  2 show a large upward shift in demand from set 2 to 3, and a small downward shift from set 3 to 4. Although sellers knew that shifts in demand were random, prices in period 8 of a set apparently aected oers in period 1 of the next set. Such carryover eects explain why there were more trades from the start in sets 3 and 4.
Eects of costing systems
H2 predicted that a bias in price oers due to absorption vs variable costing does not persist over periods 1 to 8 of a set. Table 4 reports an ANOVA for each period using LN (price oer) as the dependent variable, with absorption vs variable costing and lenient vs harsh markets as between-subjects factors. The ®rst and second columns indicate whether the mean of LN (price oer) was higher for absorption vs variable costing, and for lenient vs harsh markets, respectively. The number of observations was 80 (10 sellersÂ8 markets) in each ANOVA, except for periods 3±8 of set 6, which omitted bankrupt sellers. Focusing on set 1, costing systems had a signi®cant eect in period 1 (F 8X88Y p`0X004); the mean (median) price oer was 1162 (1048) francs under absorption costing vs 933 (968) francs under variable costing. The higher unit cost under absorption costing apparently caused higher price oers, when sellers had not yet observed actual trades and were ignorant about demand. In period 2, the mean (median) price oer was 908 (877) francs under absorption costing vs 836 (772) francs under variable costing. Although price oers were still higher under absorption costing, the eect of costing systems was no longer signi®cant. In periods 3±8, price oers under absorption vs. variable costing were about the same. In contrast, harsh vs lenient markets had an insigni®cant eect in period 1, but highly signi®cant eects in the remaining periods. R 2 increased from 0.11 in period 1 to 0.97 in period 8, due to the increasingly strong eects of markets and decreasing variation in price oers. The results for set 1 support H2. The initially observed bias did not persist, but instead was overwhelmed by demand conditions as revealed through actual trades.
The results for sets 2±6 showed a similar pattern of weak eects due to costing systems, strong eects due to markets, and increasing R 2 over periods. Unlike set 1, however, there was only a small cost-based pricing bias in period 1 of the subsequent sets (Table 4) . Although the mean value of LN(price oer) was higher under absorption costing in period 1 of each set, costing systems had no signi®cant eect. This result may be attributed to the combination of three factors. First, variation in price oers was relatively high in period 1 of each set, which lowered the likelihood of detecting of a signi®cant bias. Second, despite the random shifts in demand over sets, prices in period 8 of a set often aected oers in period 1 of the next set (see note 13). Such carryover eects would mitigate a cost-based pricing bias. Third, some sellers learned during set 1 that their costing system was of limited usefulness, and placed less reliance on unit-cost signals in subsequent sets.
As an aggregate test, an ANOVA was performed using LN(price oer) as the dependent variable, with periods (1±8) and sets (1±5) as within-subjects factors, and absorption vs variable costing and lenient vs harsh markets as betweensubjects factors. The second column of Table 3 shows the main and interactive eects. Consistent with the above results, there was an insigni®cant eect for costing systems (F 1X20Y p b 0X28), and a signi®cant eect for markets (F 409X46Y p`0X001). The signi®cant eects for sets a Each row shows the results of a separate analysis of variance. The ®rst and second columns indicate the groups with the higher means of LN (price oer). The third through ®fth columns present the F statistic, with its signi®cance level in parentheses, for each of the main and interactive eects. The last column reports the coecient of determination. a Each row shows the results of a separate analysis of variance. The ®rst through third columns report the medians for price revision, pro®t variance, and price variance, respectively. The fourth through seventh columns present the F statistic, with its signi®cance level in parentheses, for the combined eects of pro®t and price variances, the incremental eect of pro®t variances after adjusting for price variances and markets, the incremental eect of price variances after adjusting for pro®t variances and markets, and the main eect for markets, respectively. The last column reports the coecient of determination.
(F 1Y 154X22Y p`0X001) and sets Â markets (F 29X51Y p`0X001) further indicate the large impact of demand conditions. The signi®cant eects for periods (F 53X69Y p`0X001), periods Â sets (F 67X68Y p`0X001), and periods Â sets Â markets (F=8.35, p<.001), are consistent with the convergence results discussed earlier. The signi®cant eect for costing systems Â periods (F 2X03Y p`0X05) is consistent with H2. As discussed above, however, the predicted pattern of bias emergence and elimination occurred only in set 1. Finally, it is noteworthy that costing systems had an insigni®cant eect on long-run pro®tability. The mean ending franc balance was 33,655 (31,471) for sellers with absorption (variable) costing in the lenient markets, and 1706 (1623) for sellers with absorption (variable) costing in the harsh markets.
Learning from feedback
H3 predicted that price revisions depend on feedback regarding pro®t and price variances. The ®rst to third columns of Table 5 report medians for price revision, pro®t variance, and price variance, respectively. Sellers typically revised their price oers downward in sets 1, 2, 5 and 6, but upward in sets 3 and 4. All sets were similar in that price revisions mostly occurred in the early periods. Averaging over sets, 45% of the total price revision occurred by period 2, 65% by period 3, and 78% by period 4. Large (small) pro®t variances were typical in the early (late) periods of most, but not all, sets and markets.
14 Averaging over sets, 78% of sellers had zero pro®t variance in period 8. Price variances also approached zero. Averaging over sets, the median price variance decreased from 325 francs in period 1 to only 4 francs in period 8. The fourth to seventh columns of Table 5 report an ANOVA for each period using LN (price revision) as the dependent variable, lenient vs harsh markets as a between-subjects factor, and two covariates, i.e. ranked pro®t and price variances. More precisely, the dependent variable was +LN (price revision) for upward revisions, ÀLN (-price revision) for downward revisions, and zero for no revision. Each ANOVA assessed the combined and separate eects of the covariates after removing the eects of markets, which was included as a control variable. The relevant result for H3 was the combined eects of the feedback variances (column 4 of Table 5 ). In all periods, the combined eects were signi®cant, which supports H3.
To assess the relative eects of the feedback variances, two versions of the ANOVA were performed. 15 One version assessed the eects of price variances and then pro®t variances, while the other version used the reverse order. The ®fth and sixth columns of Table 5 show the incremental eects of pro®t and price variances, respectively. In period 1 of set 1, for example, pro®t variances had a signi®cant eect (F 5X98Y p`0X02) on price revisions, after removing the eects of markets and price variances. Price variances also had a signi®cant eect (F 11X34Y p`0X001) on price revisions, after removing the eects of markets and pro®t variances. Generally, price revisions were more closely associated with price variances than with pro®t variances. The information content of pro®t variances was somewhat limited in this setting, since an accepted oer implied zero pro®t variance, and a rejected oer implied a pro®t variance equal to target pro®t plus ®xed cost.
Threat of bankruptcy
H4 predicts that a greater threat of bankruptcy increases relative price revision in the early periods of a set. Using lenient vs harsh markets to proxy for the threat of bankruptcy, an ANOVA was performed using relative price revision as the dependent variable, with sets (1±5) and periods (1±7) as within-subject factors, and lenient vs harsh 14 The percentage of sellers with trades in sets 3 and 4 started and stayed high (see note 13), resulting in a median pro®t variance of zero in all periods. 15 As expected, the correlation between pro®t and price variances generally was high, but not perfect. Over periods, Spearman correlations averaged 0.61, ranging from 0.33 to 0.87. markets and absorption vs variable costing as between-subject factors. The third column of Table 3 shows the main and interactive eects.
16
The relevant result for H4 was the signi®cant eect for periods x markets (F 12X85Y p`0X001). The mean relative price revision for the harsh markets, by period, was 0. 50, 0.18, 0.11, 0.08, 0.06, 0.03, and 0.04 ; the corresponding numbers for the lenient markets were 0. 39, 0.24, 0.15, 0.08, 0.05, 0.04, and 0.05 . The dierences between markets were signi®cant in periods 1, 2, and 3 only. The higher relative price revision from period 1 to 2 in the harsh vs lenient markets supports H4. However, it should be emphasized that this eect reversed in the next two periods. Further, earlier analyses revealed that price errors generally were higher in the harsh vs lenient markets. Despite accelerated price revisions, sellers in the harsh markets were more prone to make suboptimal price decisions.
17 Table 3 shows other signi®cant eects for relative price revision. The eect for periods (F 374X99Y p`0X001) resulted from price revisions mostly occurring in early periods. The eect for periods Â sets (F 3X39Y p`0X001) resulted from dierences in the rate of price revision over sets; price revision was faster in later vs earlier sets. The eect for periods Â sets Â markets (F 2X85Y p`0X001) resulted from a dierence in the market eect over sets. Consistent with H4, relative price revision was signi®cantly higher in the harsh vs lenient markets in period 1 of sets 2, 3, 4 and 5. In period 1 of set 1, the dierence between markets was insigni®cant, which is not surprising given that sellers had to infer demand, and thus the threat of bankruptcy, from actual trades.
Concluding remarks
Research on cost-based pricing should consider the essential features of the market setting in which such decisions are made. This point applies to experimental studies, as well as to studies using other methods. When designing experiments, the incorporation of market features is facilitated by reliance on experimental economics. The standard procedures for running laboratory markets have been carefully developed and validated by hundreds of studies in the area, and a wealth of empirical evidence provides a basis for expectations about market processes and outcomes in new experiments. Using laboratory markets, researchers can examine information processing and decision making at both the individual and market levels, and address basic issues regarding the eects of individual behavior on aggregate outcomes and the eects of aggregate settings on individual behavior (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995) . This study contributed evidence about the eects of absorption vs variable costing on pricing decisions in laboratory product markets. The setting incorporated many market features including seller competition, a trading institution, and endogenous feedback. In contrast with past experiments that used individual settings, the results indicated that a pricing bias due to absorption vs variable costing did not persist. Indeed, there was clear evidence of the bias only in the initial period, when sellers had not yet observed actual trades. Through simple learning processes involving pro®t and price variances, sellers subsequently revised their price oers toward optimum without regard to unit-cost signals.
Like other laboratory markets, this study's experiment involved many design variables, e.g. type of trading institution, number of sellers, type of decision task, type of public and private information, and so on. In connection with each variable, one 16 The absence of main (and certain interactive) eects for sets, markets, and costing systems, was due to the measure of relative price revision. By construction, relative price revision had the same mean (1/7) for each set, market, and costing system. In this way, the measure controlled for the main eects of these variables, while allowing interactive eects for periods and any other factor. H4 involved the interactive eect of markets and periods.
17 These apparently con¯icting results may be reconciled by noting that relative price revision measured the percentage of a seller's total revision that occurred in each period of a set, regardless of his total revision or price errors for the set. Comparing the harsh vs lenient markets, larger relative price revisions in period 1 were not incompatible with larger price errors over all periods. may question whether the results would be dierent with an alternative design. The experiment used a posted-price institution, because cost-based pricing in natural settings often involve variants of this institution (Dorward, 1987) . Based on evidence from experimental economics, the postedprice institution probably slowed the rate of seller learning, relative to other institutions. The experiment used ten sellers in each market so that, even after bankruptcies, there would be a sucient number of sellers to warrant competitive equilibrium predictions. In a duopoly, by contrast, the nature of seller learning would be complicated by strategic considerations. The experimental task consisted of making a price oer for a single product that was produced to order. Seller learning would be more dicult if the task involved multiple products, cost allocation over products, and production for inventory as well as current sale. The experiment held demand constant for eight trading periods. Markets with more rapidly changing demand would be less conducive to learning. Finally, the experiment included public information about actual trades. Absent such information, seller learning probably would be slower, with greater reliance on pro®t variances. Future experiments that vary the design features related to seller learning would be valuable. Simon (1978) made the point that understanding human problem solving requires the study of information processes, and not just solutions per se. For example, to understand how a chess player wins a game, it is necessary to study his moves (and the opponent's reactions) in each stage of the game, and not just the con®guration of pieces at checkmate. Understanding markets, which are a form of human problem solving (cf. Bloom®eld, Libby & Nelson, 1996) , analogously requires the study of disequilibrium processes that include individual decision making and learning, and not just the conditions of competitive equilibria. Paraphrasing Smith (1991) , why is it that ®rm decision-makers, who as individuals must cope with cognitive information processing limitations, in the context of economic institutions make decisions that are consistent with predictive models based on individual rationality? Attempts to address this question would bene®t from taking seriously both psychologists explanations of individual decision behavior and economists' predictions of equilibrium outcomes. The question involves accounting, because two primary purposes of accounting are to facilitate ®rm decisions and provide feedback for ®rm learning. There are limited future gains from trying to explain accounting phenomena in terms of either individual decision processes or ecient equilibrium outcomes, taken separately. Future research should focus on the eects of alternative accounting systems on the disequilibrium behavior (i.e. decision making and learning from feedback) of procedurally rational individuals in relevant organizational or institutional settings.
up and $10.00 for participating until the end of the experiment. Also, by following the instructions carefully and making good decisions, it is possible to earn another $20.00. If you earn the $20.00, you will get a total of $35.00 when you complete the experiment. If you fail to earn the $20.00, then you will get only $15.00 when you complete the experiment.
A.1. Overview of market procedure
Each period, the market procedure will consist of four steps:
Step 1. You, and every other seller, will make a decision regarding a sales oer and write your sales oer on an OFFER SHEET Step 2. All OFFER SHEETS will be collected by staers for processing by the computer.
Step 3. The computer will determine which sales oers are accepted by buyers.
Step 4. You will receive feedback for the period, which summarizes the sales made, computes your pro®t or loss, and updates your cash balance.
A.2. Preliminary information
A.2.1. Currency During the experiment, all monetary ®gures will be expressed in terms of a special currency, francs. For example, when you make your sales oer, the price per unit will be in francs. When you receive feedback, your pro®t or loss and cash balance will be in francs. The symbol for a franc is Fr. For example, 100 Fr symbolizes the monetary ®gure of 100 francs.
A.2.2. Cash balance
At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a beginning cash balance of 50,000 Fr. Each period, your cash balance will be updated by adding your pro®t or subtracting your loss. When you complete the experiment, your cash balance will be converted from francs into a lottery number between 1 and 100, using a conversion rate of 1/1,000. The higher your ending cash balance, the higher your lottery number. Below are some examples:
If your ending cash balance is 80,000 Fr, then your lottery number would be 80,000 x 1/ 1,000 or 80. If your ending cash balance is 40,000 Fr, then your lottery number would be 40,000 x 1/ 1,000 or 40. If your ending cash balance is equal to or greater than 100,000 Fr, then your lottery number would be the maximum of 100.
At the end of the experiment, each seller will play a lottery. To illustrate, suppose Ralph is a seller who has an ending cash balance of 80,000 Fr and a lottery number of 80. Ralph plays the lottery by drawing a poker chip from a bag without looking inside. The bag contains 100 poker chips labelled with a number between 1 and 100. If Ralph draws a poker chip with a number between 1 and 80, then he wins $20.00. If he draws a poker chip with a number between 81 and 100, then he wins $0.00. To repeat, the higher your ending cash balance, the higher your lottery number. And the higher your lottery number, the easier it is to win $20.00.
A.2.3. Number of periods
There will be a minimum of 40 periods. That is, the market procedure will be repeated at least 40 times. You will not know the exact number of periods until the end of the experiment. At that time, a staer will announce``this is the last period.'' The periods will be grouped into separatè`s ets'' of 8 periods each. When referring to a speci®c period, we will use a simple code: Set 1*Period 1 refers to the ®rst period in the ®rst set of periods, Set 1*Period 2 refers to the second period in the ®rst set, and so on.
A.2.4. Buyers' demand for product
Buyers' demand refers to the relationship between product prices and the total quantity that buyers are willing to buy. Because all units of product are exactly the same, buyers focus only on the product price. When comparing sales oers, buyers always prefer the sales oer with the lowest price per unit. You will not be told anything about the level of buyers' demand in the instructions or by the staers. The only information that you will receive about the level of buyers' demand will be feedback at the end of a period which summarizes sales made in the period. The level of buyers' demand will vary for each set of periods. However, it will stay the same for each period within a set. For example, at the beginning of Set 1*Period 1, the level of buyers' demand will be determined for Set 1. It will stay the same for Set 1*Period 2, Set 1*Period 3, and so on, through Set 1*Period 8. Then, at the beginning of Set 2*Period 1, buyers' demand will change to a new level and stay at the new level through Set 2*Period 8. Because changes in the level of buyers' demand are random, it is impossible to predict whether the new level will be higher or lower than before.
A.2.5. Limits on unit sales
When you specify the maximum number of units that you are willing to sell at a certain price, the number you pick must be between one and ®ve, inclusive. It is impossible to sell more units than the maximum number of units that you specify, regardless of buyers' demand. On the other hand, it is possible to sell fewer units. For example, suppose that you oer to sell four units at a certain price per unit. It is impossible for you to sell ®ve units. However, you could sell less than four units. This would happen when buyers are willing to buy, say, only two units at the price you oer.
A.2.6. Your pro®t or loss
At the end of each period, you will receive feedback which computes your pro®t or loss, where: Pro®t or loss=sales revenue -total cost. Sales revenue equals the number of units that you actually sell multiplied by the price per unit in your sales oer. Total cost has two parts: periodic cost and production cost. Each period, you will incur a periodic cost of 1860 Fr. Regardless of what happens, you cannot avoid the periodic cost. In addition, when you sell units, you will incur a production cost which depends on the number of units that you sell, as follows: the ®rst unit has a production cost of 30 Fr, the second unit has a production cost of 160 Fr, the third unit has a production cost of 160 Fr, the fourth unit has a production cost of 650 Fr, the ®fth unit has a production cost of 650 Fr. For example, if you sell four units, your production cost would sum to 1000 Fr (30 Fr+160 Fr+160 Fr+650 Fr When writing a sales oer on the OFFER SHEET, you will be asked to specify the price in your sales oer by indicating:
(1) the cost per unit for the number of units that you specify in your sales oer, (2) an adjustment to the cost per unit, (3) the price per unit, by combining the cost per unit and the adjustment.
Your adjustment to the cost per unit may be upward or downward. However, there are two constraints on your adjustment. First, you may not specify an adjustment such that the price is negative. Second, you may not specify an adjustment such that the price is above 2000 Fr. In other words, your price per unit must be in the range from 0 Fr to 2000 Fr.
A.2.9. Bankruptcy
It is possible for you to go bankrupt. This would occur if your remaining cash balance at the end of a period is negative. If you go bankrupt, you may not continue to participate in the experiment or play the lottery. Instead, you will be paid $15.00 for showing up and participating and then asked to leave the room. 
